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SUMMARY
In this paper, we propose the decomposition ring homomorphic encryption scheme, that is a homomorphic encryption scheme built on the decomposition ring, which is a subring of cyclotomic ring. By using the decomposition ring the structure of plaintext slot becomes Z p l , instead of GF(p d ) in conventional schemes on the cyclotomic ring. For homomorphic multiplication of integers, one can use the full of Z p l slots using the proposed scheme, although in conventional schemes one can use only one-dimensional subspace GF(p) in each GF(p d ) slot. This allows us to realize fast and compact homomorphic encryption for integer plaintexts. In fact, our benchmark results indicate that our decomposition ring homomorphic encryption schemes are several times faster than HElib for integer plaintexts due to its higher parallel computation. key words: fully homomorphic encryption, ring-LWE, cyclotomic ring, decomposition ring, plaintext slots
Introduction
Background.
Homomorphic encryption (HE) scheme enables us computation on encrypted data. One can add or multiply (or more generally "evaluate") given ciphertexts and generate a new ciphertext that encrypts the sum or product (or "evaluation") of underlying data of the input ciphertexts. Such computation (called homomorphic addition or multiplication or evaluation) can be done without using the secret key and one will never know anything about the processed or generated data.
Since the breakthrough construction given by Gentry [10] , many efforts have been dedicated to make such homomorphic encryption scheme more secure and more efficient. Especially, HE schemes based on the Ring-LWE problem [5] , [9] , [20] , [21] have obtained theoreticallysound proof of security and well-established implementations such as HElib [14] and SEAL v2.0 [19] . Nowadays many researchers apply HE schemes to privacy-preserving tasks for mining of outsourced data such as genomic data, medical data, financial data and so on [7] , [13] , [16] - [18] .
Our perspective: GF(p d ) versus Z p l slots.
In order to obtain higher throughput, batching technique is widely adopted in many HE schemes, that allows us to encrypt multiple messages in a single ciphertext and enables a parallel processing in SIMD manner. The space where each of values of parallel processing is set is called "plaintext slot". The HE schemes based on the Ring-LWE problem (Ring-HE schemes in short), depend on arithmetic of cyclotomic integers [20] . Cyclotomic integers a are algebraic integers generated by some primitive m-th root of unity ζ and have the form like a = a 0 + a 1 ζ + · · · + a n−1 ζ n−1 where a i are ordinary integers in Z and n = φ(m). In the Ring-HE schemes based on cyclotomic ring, its structure of the plaintext slot is known to be Galois field GF(p d ) of some degree d. For small primes p, this degree d (> log p (m)) will be large.
Such plaintext structure is good for applications that use data represented by elements of Galois field GF(p d ), such as error correcting codes or AES ciphers. However, many applications will use integers modulo a power of prime p l (i.e., elements in Z p l ) rather than elements of Galois field GF(p d ).
We focus on the fact that restricting the cyclotomic ring to its subring called "Decomposition Ring", the slot structure shrinks from GF(p d ) to Z p . Then, by using Hensel lifting, we can enlarge the modulus from Z p to Z p l . We believe in that such plaintext structure will be more natural, easy to handle, and significantly efficient for many applications.
Method.
To realize plaintext structure composed of slots of mod-p l integers, we use decomposition ring R Z with respect to the prime p, instead of cyclotomic ring R.
Let ζ be a primitive m-th root of unity. The m-th cyclotomic ring R = {a 0 + a 1 ζ + · · · + a n−1 ζ n−1 | a i ∈ Z} is a ring of all cyclotomic integers generated by ζ, where n = φ(m) is the value of Euler function at m. Plaintext space of Ring-HE schemes will be the space of mod-p cyclotomic integers, i.e., R p = R/pR for some small prime p. It is known that in the cyclotomic ring R, the prime number p is not prime any more (in general) and it factors into a product of g prime ideals P i (with some divisor g of n): pR = P 0 P 1 · · · P g−1 .
The residual fields R/P i of each factor P i are nothing but the space of plaintext slots of Ring-HE schemes, which are isomorphic to GF(p d ) with d = n/g. Thus, the plaintext space is
The decomposition ring R Z with respect to prime p is the minimum subring of R in which the prime p has the same form of prime ideal factorization as in R , that is, pR Z = p 0 p 1 · · · p g−1 (1) with the same number g of factors. By the minimality of R Z , the residual fields R Z /p i of each factor p i must be onedimensional, that is, isomorphic to Z p . So the plaintext space on R Z will be (R Z ) p R Z /p 0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ R Z /p g−1 Z p ⊕ · · · ⊕ Z p .
Applying Hensel lift l − 1 times, we get (R Z ) p l Z p l ⊕ · · · ⊕ Z p l for p l . Thus, the decomposition ring R Z realizes plaintext slots of integers modulo p l , as desired. Note that now we can use all of the dimensions of R Z as its plaintext slots for homomorphic multiplication of mod-p l integers. This high parallelism of slot structure will bring us significantly more efficient SIMD operations for mod-p l integer plaintexts.
Two bases.
The cyclotomic ring R has attractive features that enable efficient implementation of addition/multiplication of and noise handling on their elements. Can we do similar things even if we use the decomposition ring R Z instead of cyclotomic ring R?
The cyclotomic ring R's nice properties are consolidated to the existence of two types of bases [21] :
• The power(ful) basis: Composed of short and nearly orthogonal vectors to each other. Used when rounding rational cyclotomic numbers to their nearest cyclotomic integers. • The CRT basis: Related to the FFT transformation and multiplication. Vectors of coefficients of given two cyclotomic integers w.r.t. the CRT basis can be multiplied component-wise, resulting a new vector corresponding to the multiplied cyclotomic integer.
We investigate structure of the decomposition ring R Z , following the way in cyclotomic cases given by Lyubashevsky, Peikert, and Regev [21] . Then, we will give two types of bases of R Z , called η-basis and ξ-basis, which can substitute well for the power(ful) and CRT bases in cyclotomic cases, respectively.
Construction.
Based on the above investigation, we construct two types of homomorphic encryption schemes over the decomposition ring: DR-FV and DR-BGV. The DR-FV and DR-BGV schemes realize the FV [9] and the BGV scheme [5] over the decomposition ring, respectively. We show several bounds on the noise growth occurring among homomorphic computations and prove that both of DR-FV and DR-BGV schemes are fully homomorphic on modulus of magnitude q = O(λ log λ ).
Security.
For security we will need hardness of a variant of the decisional Ring-LWE problem over the decomposition ring. Recall the search version of Ring-LWE problem is already proved to have a quantum polynomial time reduction from the approximate shortest vector problem of ideal lattices in any number field by Lyubashevsky, Peikert, and Regev [20] . They proved equivalence between the search and decisional versions of the Ring-LWE problems only for cyclotomic rings. However, it is not difficult to see that the equivalence holds also over the decomposition rings, since those are subrings of cyclotomic rings and inherit good properties about prime ideal decomposition from them.
Efficiency.
Here, we compare efficiency of DR-FV (or DR-BGV) with the conventional HE scheme on the cyclotomic ring (CR-HE for short). In CR-HE, the ring dimension is n = φ(m), the number of slots is g = n/d and the dimension of each slot is d. So, one can encrypt g integer plaintexts into a single ciphertext of n (= gd) dimension. On the contrary, in DR-FV (or DR-BGV), the ring dimension and the number of slots are both g and the dimension of each slot is 1. One can encrypt g integer plaintexts into a single ciphertext of the same dimension g. Thus, on the same level of security (i.e. same dimension), DR-FV (or DR-BGV) can handle d times as many plaintexts as CR-HE in a single ciphertext. This means that DR-FV (or DR-BGV) achieves more faster and compact HE than conventional CR-HE for integer plaintexts. More concrete benchmark results are given in Sect. 5.
Related works.
In 2009, Gentry [10] established the fully homomorphic encryption scheme for the first time. After this breakthrough, representative two schemes, BGV scheme [5] and FV [9] scheme, are proposed depending on the techniques such as key switching [6] and modulus switching [5] . Since the computational cost of homomorphic operations are very expensive, parallel computing is needed for higher throughput. The SIMD technique, proposed by [22] , enables parallel homomorphic computation using the CRT over polynomials, and has been adopted in many HE schemes. We focus on the wasteful slot structure of such HE schemes based on cyclotomic ring, and improve the slot structure using the decomposition ring. Kim and Song [15] also focus on the similar issue and construct HE based on another subring of the cyclotomic ring, called "conjugate-invariant ring", aiming for efficient homomorphic fixed-point number computation. Terada, Nakano, Okumura and Miyaji [23] conducted some experiments regarding lattice attack against Ring-LWE problem over the decomposition ring. They concluded that the Ring-LWE problem on the decomposition ring is expected to be as secure as the ordinal Ring-LWE problem on the cyclotomic ring. This paper is a full version of [1] .
Organization.
In Sect. 2 we prepare notions and tools needed for our work, especially about cyclotomic rings. Section 3 investigates structure and properties of the decomposition ring, and gives its η-basis and ξ-basis as well as quasi-linear time conversion between them. In Sect. 4 we state a variant of the Ring-LWE problem over the decomposition ring and construct our two homomorphic encryption schemes over the ring. Finally, Sect. 5 shows our benchmark results, comparing efficiency of our two homomorphic encryption schemes and HElib. Proofs of lemmas or theorems are collected in the appendices.
Preliminaries
Notation.
For a positive integer m, Z m denotes the ring of congruent integers mod m, and Z * m denotes its multiplicative subgroup. For an integer a (that is prime to m), ord × m (a) denotes the order of a ∈ Z * m . Basically vectors are supposed to represent column vectors. The symbol 1 denotes a column vector with all entries equal to 1. I n denotes the n × n identity matrix. The symbol Diag(α 1 , · · · , α n ) means a diagonal matrix with diagonals α 1 , . . . , α n . For vectors x, y (∈ C n ), x, y = n i=1 x i y i denotes the inner product of x and y. x 2 =
x, x denotes the l 2 -norm and 
Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
A homomorphic encryption scheme is a quadruple HE=(Gen, Encrypt, Decrypt, Evaluate) of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms. Gen generates a public key pk, a secret key sk and an evaluation key evk: (pk, sk, evk) ← Gen(1 λ ). Encrypt encrypts a plaintext x ∈ X to a ciphertext c under a public key pk: c ← Encrypt(pk, x). Decrypt decrypts a ciphertext c to a plaintext x using the secret key sk:
x ← Decrypt(sk, c). Evaluate applies a function f : X l → X (given as an arithmetic circuit) to ciphertexts c 1 , . . . , c l and outputs a new ciphertext c f using the evaluation key evk : c f ← Evaluate(evk, f, c 1 , . . . , c l ). A homomorphic encryption scheme HE is Lhomomorphic for L = L(λ) if for any function f : X l → X given as an arithmetic circuit of depth L and for any l plaintexts x 1 , . . . , x l ∈ X, it holds that Decrypt sk (Evaluate evk ( f, c 1 , . . . , c l )) = f (x 1 , . . . , x l ) for c i ← Encrypt pk (x i ) (i = 1, . . . , l) except with a negligible probability (i.e., Decrypt sk is ring homomorphic). A homomorphic encryption scheme is called fully homomorphic if it is L-homomorphic for any polynomial function L = poly(λ).
Gaussian Distributions and Subgaussian Random Variables
For a positive real s > 0, the n-dimensional (spherical) Gaussian function ρ s : R n → (0, 1] is defined as ρ s (x) = exp(−π x 2 2 /s 2 ). It defines the continuous Gaussian distribution D s with density s −n ρ s (x).
A random variable X over R is called subgaussian with parameter s (> 0) if E[exp(2πtX)] ≤ exp(πs 2 t 2 ) (∀t ∈ R). A random variable X over R n is called subgaussian with parameter s if X, u is subgaussian with parameter s for any unit vector u ∈ R n . A random variable X according to Gaussian distribution D s is subgaussian with parameter s. A bounded random variable X (as |X| ≤ B) with E[X] = 0 is subgaussian with parameter B √ 2π. A subgaussian random variable with parameter s satisfies the tail inequality:
Lattices
For n linearly independent vectors B = {b j } n j=1 ⊂ R n , Λ = L(B) = n j=1 z j b j | z j ∈ Z (∀ j) is called an ndimensional lattice. For a lattice Λ ⊂ R n , its dual lattice is defined by Λ ∨ = y ∈ R n | x, y ∈ Z (∀x ∈ Λ) . The dual lattice is itself a lattice. The dual of dual lattice is the same as the original lattice: (Λ ∨ ) ∨ = Λ. For a countable subset A ⊂ R n , the sum D s (A) def = x∈A D s (x) is well-defined. The discrete Gaussian distribution D Λ+c,s on a (coset of) lattice Λ is defined by restricting the continuous Gaussian distribution D s on the (coset of) lattice Λ:
Number Fields
A complex number α ∈ C is called an algebraic number if it satisfies f (α) = 0 for some nonzero polynomial f (X) ∈ Q[X] over Q. For an algebraic number α, the monic and irreducible polynomial f (X) satisfying f (α) = 0 is uniquely determined and called the minimum polynomial of α. An algebraic number α generates a number field K = Q(α) over Q, which is isomorphic to Q[X]/( f (X)), via g(α) → g(X). The dimension of K as a Q-vector space is called the degree of K and denoted as [K : Q]. By the isomorphism, [K : Q] = deg f . An algebraic number α is called an algebraic integer if its minimum polynomial belongs to Z[X]. All algebraic integers belonging to a number field K = Q(α) constitutes a ring R, called an integer ring of K. A number field K = Q(α) has n (= [K : Q]) isomorphisms ρ i (i = 1, . . . , n) to subfields of the complex number field C. The trace map Tr K|Q : K → Q is defined by Tr K|Q (a) = n i=1 ρ i (a) (∈ Q). If all of the isomorphisms ρ i induce automorphisms of K (i.e., ρ i (K) = K for any i), the field K is called a Galois extension of Q and the set of isomorphisms Gal(K|Q) def = {ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n } constitutes a group, called the Galois group of K over Q. By the Galois theory, all subfields L of K and all subgroups H of G = Gal(K|Q) corresponds to each other one-to-one:
: the stabilizer group of L H → L = K H = {a ∈ K | ρ(a) = a for any ρ ∈ H} : the fixed field by H.
Here, K is also a Galois extension of L with Galois group Gal(K|L) = H (since any isomorphism (of K into C) that fixes L sends K to K). Especially, [K : L] = |H|. The trace map of K over L is defined by Tr K|L (a) = ρ∈H ρ(a) (∈ L) for a ∈ K.
Cyclotomic Fields and Rings
Let m be a positive integer. A primitive m-th root of unity ζ = exp(2π √ −1/m) has the minimum polynomial Φ m (X) ∈ Z[X] of degree n = φ(m) that belongs to Z[X], called the cyclotomic polynomial. Especially, ζ is an algebraic integer. A number field K = Q(ζ) generated by ζ is called the m-th cyclotomic field and its elements are called cyclotomic numbers. The integer ring R of the cyclotomic field K = Q(ζ) is known to be R = Z[ζ] = Z[X]/Φ m (X). In particular, as a Z-module, R has a basis (called power basis) {1, ζ, . . . , ζ n−1 }, i.e., R = Z · 1 + Z · ζ + · · · + Z · ζ n−1 . The integer ring R is called the m-th cyclotomic ring and its elements are called cyclotomic integers. For a positive integer q, R q = R/qR = Z q [X]/Φ m (X) is a ring of cyclotomic integers mod q.
The cyclotomic field K = Q(ζ) is a Galois extension over Q since it has n = [K : Q] automorphisms ρ i defined by
The trace of ζ for the prime index m is simple:
Structure of R p
Let p be a prime that does not divide m. Although the cyclotomic polynomial Φ m (X) is irreducible over Z, by taking mod p, it will be factored into a product of several polynomials F i (X)'s:
where all of F i (X) are irreducible mod p, and have the same degree d = ord × m (p) which is a divisor of n. The number of factors is equal to g = n/d.
It is known that there are g prime ideals P 0 , . . . , P g−1 of R lying over p : P i ∩ Z = pZ (i = 0, . . . , g − 1) and p decomposes into a product of those prime ideals in R:
This decomposition of the prime p reflects the factorization of Φ m (X) mod p (Eq. (3)). In fact, each prime factor P i is generated by p and F i (ζ) as ideals of R,
The corresponding residual fields are given by
In the Ring-HE schemes such as [4] , [5] , [9] , plaintexts are encoded by cyclotomic integers x ∈ R p modulo some small prime p ( m). By the factorization of R p above, g plaintexts x 0 , . . . , x g−1 belonging to GF(p d ) are encoded into a single cyclotomic integer x ∈ R p . The place of each plaintext x i ∈ GF(p d ) is called a plaintext slot. Thus, in the Ring-HE schemes, one can encrypt g plaintexts into a single ciphertext by setting them on corresponding plaintext slots and can evaluate or decrypt the g encrypted plaintexts at the same time using arithmetic of cyclotomic integers [22] . Gentry, Halevi, and Smart [12] homomorphically evaluates AES circuit on HE-encrypted AES-ciphertexts in the SIMD manner, using such plaintext slot structure for p = 2, which fits to the underlying GF(2 d )-arithmetic of the AES cipher.
Geometry of Numbers
Using the n automorphisms ρ i (i ∈ Z * m ), the cyclotomic field K is embedded into an n-dimensional complex vector space
Since H = BR n with the unitary matrix B =
, the space H is isomorphic to R n as an inner product R-space (where J is the reversal matrix of the identity matrix I).
By the canonical embedding σ, one can regard R (or its (fractional) ideals of R) as lattices in the n-dimensional real vector space H, called ideal lattices. Inner products or norms of elements a ∈ K are defined through the embedding σ:
Decomposition Rings and Their Properties
To realize plaintext structure composed of slots of modp l integers for some small prime p, we use decomposition rings R Z w.r.t. p instead of cyclotomic rings R.
Decomposition Field
Let G = Gal(K|Q) be the Galois group of the m-th cyclotomic field K = Q(ζ) over Q. Let p be a prime that does not divide m. Recall such p has the prime ideal decomposition of Eq. (4). The decomposition group
It is known that the decomposition group G Z is generated by the automorphism ρ p corresponding to the prime p, called the Frobenius map w.r.t. p:
The fixed field Z = K G Z by G Z is called the decomposition field of K (w.r.t. p). The decomposition field Z can be characterized as the smallest subfield Z of K such that P i ∩ Z does not split in K, so that the prime p factorizes into prime ideals in Z in much the same way as in K. By the Galois theory, G Z = Gal(K|Z). For degrees, we have
The decomposition field Z is itself the Galois extension of Q and its Galois group Gal(Z|Q) = G/G Z is given by Gal(Z|Q) Z * m / p .
Decomposition Ring
The integer ring R Z = R ∩ Z of the decomposition field Z is called the decomposition ring. Primes ideals over p in the decomposition ring R Z are given by p i = P i ∩ Z for i = 0, . . . , g − 1, and the prime p factors into the product of those prime ideals in much the same way as in K:
This leads to the decomposition of (R Z ) p :
For each prime ideal P i (of R) lying over p i , the Frobenius map ρ p acts as the p-th power automorphism pow p (x) = x p on R/P i :
Then, by definition of R Z = R ρ p , any element in R Z /p i must be fixed by pow p , which means:
Thus, we see that all slots of (R Z ) p must be one-dimensional:
Here we recall Hensel Lifting:
be monic integer polynomials, such that F, G are co-prime modulo p, and F · G = Φ (mod p i ). Then there exist monic
Here, note that the number g of irreducible factors and the degree d of each factor remain unchanged in the lifting. According to this factorization, the ideal p l R of R is factored as
Then, on the decomposition ring, we get
with q i = Q i ∩ Z and R Z /q i Z p l . This structure of the decomposition ring (R Z ) p l brings us the plaintext structure of our decomposition ring homomorphic encryption scheme, being composed of g mod-p l integer slots.
Bases of the Decomposition Ring R Z
To construct homomorphic encryption schemes using some ring R, we will need two types of bases of the ring R over Z, one for decoding elements in R ⊗ R into its nearest element in R, and another one that enables FFT-like fast computations among elements in R. In addition, we also need some quasi-linear time transformations among vector representations with respect to the two types of bases. Here, assuming the index m of cyclotomic ring R is prime, we construct such two types of bases for the decomposition ring R Z , following the cyclotomic ring case given by Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev [21] .
The η-Basis
Let m be a prime and K = Q(ζ) be the m-th cyclotomic field. For a prime p ( m), let Z be the decomposition field of K with respect to p.
Fix any set of representatives {t 0 , . . . , t g−1 } of Z * m / p Gal(Z|Q). For i = 0, . . . , g − 1, define
For the prime index m, the set {η 0 , . . . , η g−1 } is a basis of the decomposition ring R Z (w.r.t. p ( m)) over Z, i.e., R Z = Zη 0 + · · · + Zη g−1 .
Definition 1: We call the basis η := (η 0 , . . . , η g−1 ) η-basis of R Z . For any a ∈ R Z , there exists unique a ∈ Z g satisfying a = η T a. We call such a ∈ Z g η-vector of a ∈ R Z .
The ξ-Basis
By the choice of t i 's, the Galois group Gal(Z|Q) of Z is given by
Elements a ∈ Z in the decomposition field are regarded as g-dimensional R-vectors through the canonical embed-
Note that each column of Ω Z is the canonical embedding σ Z (η j ) of η j . Since the index m is prime, the Galois group Gal(Z|Q) is cyclic and we can take the representatives {t 0 , . . . , t g−1 } so that t j ≡ t j (mod p ) with some t ∈ Z * m for j = 0, . . . , g − 1. Setting η = Tr K|Z (ζ), for any i and j,
In particular, Ω Z is symmetric. We can show that:
In particular,
.
Since Ω Z is symmetric,
Let q be a power of the prime p. (Later we will use q = p l for the plaintext modulus and q = p r for the ciphertext modulus of the FV-type scheme.) Let q = q 0 be the first ideal that appears in the factorization of qR Z (Eq. (6)).
Conversion between ηand ξ-Vectors

Resolution of Unity in R Z mod q
As stated before, by Hensel-lifting the factorization of Φ m (X) mod p (Eq. (3)) to modulus q which is a power of p, we get factorization of Φ m (X) mod q: Φ m (X) ≡ F 0 (X) · · · F g−1 (X) (mod q). According to this factorization, the ideal qR of R is factored as qR = Q 0 · · · Q g−1 with ideals
and it holds that
By the Chinese remainder theorem, the resolution of unity
is uniquely determined mod qR. In the following we take coefficients of each τ i from [−q/2, q/2) over the basis
is also a resolution of unity in R Z mod q.
Using the resolution of unity {τ i } g−1 i=0 in R Z , we can compute a i ∈ Z q satisfying a ≡ a i (mod q i ) given a ∈ R Z , as follows:
(∈ Z g×g q ) by computing the entities η i+ j in Ω Z as cyclotomic integers and reducing them modulo q (= q 0 ) using the resolution of unity {τ i } g−1 i=0 . Since the matrix Ω (q) Z has cyclic structure (the (i + 1)-th row is a left shift of the i-th row), it is sufficient to compute its first row. Here, we remark that once we have computed the matrix Ω (q) Z , we can totally forget the original structure of cyclotomic ring R, and all we need is doing various computations among ηand ξ-vectors (of elements in R Z ) with necessary conversion between them using the matrix Ω (q) Z .
Computation of
To convert η-vector a of an element a = η T · a ∈ R Z to its corresponding ξ-vector b (satisfying a = ξ T · b), by Lemma 7, we need to compute a matrix-vector product b = Ω (q) Z · a. By Lemma 6, the inverse conversion from ξ-vector b to its corresponding η-vector a = Γ Z · b also can be computed using a similar matrix-vector product Ω (q)
By definition of Ω (q) Z , the j-th component b j of the product b = Ω (q) Z · a is b j = g−1 i=0 a i η i+ j (where indexes are mod g and we omit mod q). This means that b is the convolution product of vector η and the reversal vector (a 0 , a g−1 , a g−2 , · · · , a 1 ) of a, where η =
Since b is the convolution product of η and the reversal vector of a, it holds that f (X)g(X) =
. The polynomial product f (X)g(X) (mod X g − 1) can be computed in quasi-linear timeÕ(g) using the FFT multiplication. Thus, we know that conversions between η-vectors a and ξ-vectors b can be done in quasilinear timeÕ(g).
Remark : In the BGV-type scheme, the ciphertext modulus makes a chain which contains L modulus q 0 , · · · , q L−1 using L primes p 0 , · · · , p L−1 s.t. q i = Π i j=0 p j . For each modulus q i , we generate a matrix Ω (q i ) Z in Z g×g q i to convert between η-vector and ξ-vector efficiently. More precisely, the reason why the method of Sects. 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 work is that the modulus q factors completely on the decomposition ring R Z with respect to the prime p. When we choose each prime p j to satisfy p j ≡ 1 (mod m) then p j factors completely on the cyclotomic ring and thus also factors completely on the decomposition ring R Z . Therefore we can generate Ω (p j ) Z (∈ Z g×g p j ) for such primes p j using the method of Sects. 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, and we get Ω (q i ) Z by CRT-lifting the matrices Ω (p j ) Z ( j = 0, · · · , i) entity-wise:
Homomorphic Encryption Based on Decomposition Ring
Now we construct two types of homomorphic encryption schemes over the decomposition ring: DR-FV and DR-BGV. Recall the search version of Ring-LWE problem is already proved to have a quantum polynomial time reduction from the approximate shortest vector problem of ideal lattices in any number field by Lyubashevsky, Peikert, and Regev [20] . They proved equivalence between the search and the decisional versions of the Ring-LWE problems only for cyclotomic rings. The key of their proof of equivalence is the existence of prime modulus q for Ring-LWE problem which totally decomposes into n prime ideal factors: qR = Q 0 · · · Q n−1 . (Their residual fields R/Q i have polynomial order q and we can guess the solution of the Ring-LWE problem modulo ideal Q i , and then we can verify validity of the guess using the assumed oracle for the decisional Ring-LWE problem.) Since the decomposition ring R Z is a subring of the cyclotomic ring R, such modulus q totally decomposes into g prime ideals also in the decomposition ring R Z : qR Z = q 0 · · · q g−1 . Using this decomposition, the proof of equivalence by [20] holds also over the decomposition rings R Z , essentially as it is.
Parameters
Let m be a prime index of cyclotomic ring R. Choose a (small) prime p, distinct from m. Let d = ord × m (p) be the multiplicative order of p mod m, and g = (m − 1)/d be the degree of the decomposition ring R Z of R with respect to p. The plaintext modulus t = p l is a power of p and the ciphertext modulus q will be chosen below.
Sampling
We will use the following three types of sampling algorithms regarding as R Z .
The uniform distribution U q : This is uniform distribution over (Z/qZ) g identified with (Z ∩ (−q/2, q/2]).
The discrete gaussian distribution G q (σ 2 ): The discrete gaussian distribution G q (σ 2 ) draws a g dimension integer vector which rounds a normal gaussian distribution with zero-mean and variance σ 2 to the nearest integer and outputs that integer vector reduced modulo q (into interval (−q/2, q/2]).
The HWT (h) distribution: The HWT (h) distribution chooses a vector uniformly at random from {0, ±1} g that has h nonzero entries.
Bounds on Noises
We analyze bounds of noises according to the way of [8] .
Let a = g i=0 a i η i denote a random element of R Z . The canonical embedding of each η i has approximately Euclidean norm φ(m) (= gd). Letting V a be the variance of each coefficient of a, the variance of a is estimated as V a gd.
When a ← U q then V a is (q − 1) 2 /12 ≈ q 2 /12, hence the variance of a is V U = q 2 gd/12. When a ← G q (σ 2 ) then the variance of a is V G = σ 2 gd. When choosing a ← HWT (h), the variance of a is V H = hd.
The random element of R Z is a sum of many independent distributed random variables, hence its distribution is approximated by a gaussian distribution of the same variance. We use six standard deviations as a bound on the size of a: a ∞ ≤ 6 √ V. We use 16 σ a σ b as a bound of product ab of two random variables both distributed closely to gaussian distributions of variances σ a and σ b , respectively. For a product of three random variables with variances σ a , σ b and σ c , we use 40 σ a σ b σ c .
Encoding Methods of Elements in R Z
Basically, we use η-vectors a ∈ Z g to encode elements a = η T · a in R Z . To multiply two elements encoded by η-vectors a and b modulo q, first we convert those η-vectors to corresponding ξ-vectors modulo q. We can multiply resulting ξ-vectors component-wise, and then re-convert the result into its corresponding η-vector modulo q. The functions eta to xi and xi to eta use the matrix Ω (q) Z computed in advance. (η i ) g−1 i=0 denotes the first row of Ω (q) Z .
mult eta (a, b, q) :
eta to xi(a, q) :
These algorithms can be computed by O(g log g) operations of underlying mod q integers by using the FFT multiplications of degree g polynomials (see Sect. 3 
.4.3).
We regard plaintext vectors m ∈ Z g t as ξ-vectors of corresponding elements m ξ = ξ T m ∈ (R Z ) t . By Lemma 8 their products m ξ m ξ ∈ (R Z ) t encodes the plaintext vector m m ∈ Z g t . For a fixed integer base w, let l w = log w (q) +1. Any vector a ∈ Z g q can be written as a = l w −1 k=0 a k w k with vectors a k ∈ Z l w w of small entries. Define WD(a)
Two Types of Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
We construct two types of homomorphic encryption schemes based on the decomposition ring. The first scheme DR-FV is based on the FV scheme proposed by Fan and Vercauteren [9] , in which a plaintext is placed in the most significant digits of ciphertext modulus (called MSD form). The second scheme DR-BGV is based on the BGV scheme proposed by Brakerski, Gentry, and Vaikuntanathan [5] , in which a plaintext is placed in the lowest significant digits of ciphertext modulus (called LSD form).
FV-type
Here, (a, b) denotes a ciphertext, s denotes a secret key, f is a factor of plaintext m, e denotes a noise, l is ciphertext level, and t and q are modulus of plaintext and ciphertext.
Scheme Description
Each scheme is given as symmetric key version. The public key version is easily derived as usual.
Our schemes have two functions for HE.Gen. SecretKeyGen() generates a secret key sk. Using the secret key sk, SwitchKeyGen(x, sk) generates a switching key swk from x to sk. Especially it gives the evaluation key evk taking x = sk 2 : evk ← SwitchKeyGen(sk 2 , sk). Encrypt(sk, m) encrypts a message m under the secret key sk and outputs a ciphertext ct, and Decrypt(sk, ct) decrypts the ciphertext ct under the secret key sk and outputs a message m. Given an arithmetic circuit of function f , HE.Evaluate evaluates the circuit of f on given ciphertexts homomorphically. It uses Add(ct 1 , ct 2 ) when evaluating an addition gate and uses Mult(swk, ct 1 , ct 2 ) when evaluating a multiplication gate.
DR-FV Scheme
We use a ciphertext modulus q = p r and a plaintext modulus t = p l (r > l). Let ∆ = q t = p r−l . (2) Encryption
The input plaintext m is interpreted as a ξ-vector. In the resulting ciphertext, B FV clean denotes the bound of its noise.
clean ) This can be computed by O(g log g) operations of underlying mod q integers.
(3) Decryption
Decryption removes the noise in the ciphertext by taking its right shift (by 1 ∆ ) and rounding.
This can be computed by O(g log g) operations of underlying mod q integers.
(4) Addition
Addition algorithm takes as input two ciphertext ct 1 and ct 2 and outputs a ciphertext ct encrypting the sum of underlying plaintexts.
Add DR−FV (ct 1 = (a 1 , b 1 , ν 1 ), ct 2 = (a 2 , b 2 , ν 2 ), prm) :
This can be computed by O(g) operations of underlying mod q integers.
(5) Multiplication
Multiplication algorithm takes as input two ciphertext ct 1 and ct 2 and outputs a ciphertext ct encrypting the product of underlying plaintexts.
Mult DR−FV (swk, ct 1 = (a 1 , b 1 , ν 1 ), ct 2 = (a 2 , b 2 , ν 2 ), prm) :
Here, Linearize switches the key in the ciphertext from s 2 to s using swk. Linearize DR−FV (swk, ct = (α, β, γ, ν), prm) :
KeySwitch takes a switching key swk of y and a vector x as input, and returns a ciphertext encrypting the product x y. In the multiplication, swk is an encryption of s 2 and x = γ so the output is a ciphertext of s 2 γ.
As easily verified, the total complexity of Mult DR−FV is O(l w g log g) of underlying mod q integers.
DR-BGV Scheme
Ciphertext modulus chain: For scaling down ciphertext, the ciphertext modulus makes a chain which contains L modulus q 0 , · · · , q L−1 using L primes p 0 , · · · , p L−1 s.t. q i = Π i j=0 p j and primes are p i ≡ 1 (mod m). We call a modulus q i ciphertext as a level-i ciphertext. The level of a fresh ciphertext is L − 1 and one level is consumed by one multiplication. In the scheme, we use another special modulus q s to reduce noise.
(1) Key Generation
The SecretKeyGen generates a secret key of the maximum level L − 1.
This can be computed by O(g log g) operations of underlying mod q L−1 integers.
In the SwitchingKeyGen, we temporarily enlarge the modulus by multiplying q s , to reduce the noise occurring.
SwitchKeyGen DR−BGV (x, sk = s ξ , prm) :
j=0 , ν = B BGV lin ) This can be computed by O(l w g log g) operations of underlying mod q L−1 q s integers.
(2) Encryption
The level of a fresh ciphertext is the maximum level L − 1.
clean ) This can be computed by O(g log g) operations of underlying mod q L−1 integers.
(3) Decryption
Decryption algorithm removes the noise placed in upper digits by taking residue with respect to plaintext modulus t.
This can be computed by O(g log g) operations of underlying mod q l integers.
(4) Rescale
Rescale scales down a modulus of a given ciphertext from q l to q l (q l > q l ), to reduce its noise. Setting P be q l /q l , the noise is scaled down by a factor of 1/P, however an additional noise term B BGV scale appears.
This can be computed by O(g log g) operations of underlying mod q l and mod q l integers.
(5) Addition
Assume the level of ct 2 is not greater than the level of ct 1 .
Add DR−BGV (ct 1 = (a 1 , b 1 , f 1 , l 1 , ν 1 ), ct 2 = (a 2 , b 2 , f 2 , l 2 , ν 2 ), prm) :
This can be computed by O(g log g) operations of underlying mod q l 1 and mod q l 2 integers.
(6) Multiplication
Assume the level of ct 2 is not greater than the level of ct 1 . At the last step in Mult, one level is consumed to reduce the incurred noise.
Here, the key switching procedure is described below.
Linearize DR−BGV (swk, ct = (α, β, γ, f, l, ν), prm) :
In the last step of KeySwitch, the size of modulus is lowered from q l q s to q l to reduce noise in the key.
The total complexity of Mult DR−BGV is sum of O(g log g) operations with respect to the ciphertext modulus q 2 and q 1 q s , and O(l w g log g) operations with respect to q 1 .
It is direct to see that:
Theorem 1: The decomposition ring homomorphic encryption schemes DR-FV and DR-BGV are indistinguishably secure under the chosen plaintext attack if the R-DLWE q,χ key ,χ err problem on the decomposition ring R Z is hard.
For correctness we have the following theorem. (The proof is in Appendix C) Theorem 2: The decomposition ring homomorphic encryption schemes DR-FV and DR-BGV will be fully homomorphic under circular security assumption (i.e., an encryption of secret key s does not leak any information about s) by taking ciphertext modulus q = O(λ log λ ) for DR-FV , and p i = Ω( √ λ) (i = 1, . . . , L = Ω(log λ)) and q s = Ω( √ λ) for DR-BGV.
Benchmark Results
We implemented our two decomposition ring homomorphic encryption schemes DR-FV and DR-BGV, using the C++ language and performed several experiments using different parameters, comparing efficiency of our implementation of DR-FV, DR-BGV and the homomorphic encryption library HElib by Halevi and Shoup [14] , which is based on the BGV scheme over ordinal cyclotomic rings [5] . SEAL [19] is a homomorphic encryption library of FV-type. Recall that our target plaintext space is a power of small prime since we think many applications will use such plaintext modulus (e.g. 2 l ), however in the CRT batching of SEAL, the plaintext modulus t is required to be t ≡ 1 (mod m) and cannot be a power of small prime. For this reason, we do not compare our schemes with SEAL. For notation of parameters, see Sect. 4.2. As common parameters, we choose four values of prime m so that the mth cyclotomic ring R will have as many number of plaintext slots (i.e., large g and small d values) as possible. The plaintext modulus t = 2 l is fixed as l = 8. The noise parameter s err = √ 2πσ err is fixed as σ err = 3.2. The ciphertext modulus q of bit-length r is chosen as small as possible so that it enables homomorphic evaluation of exponentiation by 2 8 (i.e., Enc(s, m) 2 8 ) with respect to each implementation. In the DR-FV, the modulus is q = 2 r with r in Table 1 . In the BGV-type schemes (DR-BGV and HElib), the modulus is q 8 = p 0 · · · p 8 q s and we describe the bit-length r of q 8 in Table 1 . Table 1 summarizes the chosen parameters.
Assuming that there is no special attack utilizing the particular algebraic structure of involving rings, corresponding security parameters λ are estimated using the lweestimator-9302d4204b4f by [2] , [3] . Table 2 shows timing results for HElib in milliseconds on Intel Celeron(R) CPU G1840 @ 2.80 GHz × 2. (We could not perform the test for par-131071 due to shortage of memory.) The secret key is chosen uniformly random among binary vectors of Hamming weight 64 over the power basis (default of HElib) and we encrypt g number of mod-2 l integer plaintexts into a single HElib ciphertext using plaintext slots. As seen in Sect. 2.5, HElib basically realizes GF(2 d ) arithmetic in each of g slots. If we want to encrypt mod-2 l integer plaintexts on slots and to homomorphically evaluate on them, we can use only 1-dimensional constant polynomials in each d(= n/g)-dimensional slots. This should cause certain waste in time and space. In fact, for example, timings for par-43691 (g = 1285) is much larger than two times of those for par-8191 (g = 630) while being the ratio of g is 1285/630 ≈ 2. This indicates that the HElib scheme cannot handle many mod-2 l integer slots with high parallelism. So, to encrypt large number of mod-2 l integer plaintexts using HElib, we have no choice but to prepare many ciphertexts, each of which encrypts a divided set of small number of plaintexts on their slots.
On the other hand, Table 3 and Table 4 shows timing results (also in milliseconds on Intel Celeron(R) CPU G1840 @ 2.80GHz × 2) for our DR-FV scheme and DR-BGV scheme, respectively.
The secret key is chosen uniformly random among binary vectors of Hamming weight 64 over η-basis and we encrypt g number of mod-2 l integer plaintexts into a single DR-FV or DR-BGV ciphertext. As seen, DR-BGV scheme is a little bit faster than DR-FV scheme, due to the effect of rescaling ciphertext modulus to the smaller ones after linearization. In both schemes, timings are approximately linear with respect to the number of slots g. This means that the DR-FV and DR-BGV schemes can handle many mod-2 l slots with high parallelism, as expected. We can encrypt large number of mod-2 l integer plaintexts into a single DR-FV or DR-BGV ciphertext using mod-2 l slots without waste, and can homomorphically compute on them with high parallelism.
Then, which is faster to encrypt many number of mod-2 l integer plaintexts between the following two cases?
(1) A single DR-BGV ciphertext with many plaintext slots. (2) Many HElib ciphertexts with small number of plaintext slots.
The result for par-131071 of Table 4 shows we can encrypt 7710 mod-2 l integer slots in a single DR-BGV ciphertext with security parameter λ = 84 with timing:
(30. 14, 29.35, 3.70, 282.11, 1678 .52)
On a while, the result for par-8191 of Table 2 shows one can encrypt the same number of 7710 mod-2 l integer slots using 7710/630 = 13 ciphertexts with security parameter λ = 92. The 13 times of the line par-8191 of Table 2 Thus, our benchmark indicates that Case (1) (a single DR-BGV ciphertext with many slots) is significantly faster than Case (2) (many HElib ciphertexts with small number of plaintext slots) under the similar level of security parameters.
Since the index m is prime, the cyclotomic ring R has a basis B = {1, ζ, . . . , ζ m−2 } over Z. Since ζ is a unit of R, B := ζB = {ζ, ζ 2 , . . . , ζ m−1 } is also a basis of R over Z. The fixing group G Z = ρ p of Z acts on B and decomposes it into g orbits ζ t i p = {ζ t i , ζ t i p , . . . , ζ t i p d−1 } (i = 0, . . . , g−1). An element z = m−1 i=1 z i ζ i ∈ R Z that is stable under the action of G Z must have constant integer coefficients over the each orbits ζ t i p . Hence, z is a Z-linear combination of {η 1 , . . . , η g }
(3) Proof of Lemma 5
For 0 ≤ i, j < g,
Here, Suppose i j. Then, −t i + bt j 0 (mod m) for any b ∈ p . Hence, by Lemma 1,
If i = j, since Tr K|Q (ζ −t i +bt i ) = m − 1 only if b = 1 and −1 otherwise by Lemma 1,
For any i, by Lemma 3 and 5 we have
Similarly, for any i j we have
The first claim is the definition of ξ.
Since
Next, The ideal qR Z factors in R Z as
be a resolution of unity in R Z mod q. Here, we take the coefficients of each τ i from [−q/2, q/2) over the η-basis {η 0 , . . . , η g−1 } of R Z .
Then,
is also a resolution of unity in R mod q. Since the coefficients of each τ i over the η-basis are in [−q/2, q/2), by definition of η i = a∈ p ζ t i a , their coefficients over the basis B are trivially also in [−q/2, q/2). Hence, by the uniqueness of resolution, it must be that τ i = τ i for all i
Appendix B: Norms on the Decomposition Ring
Let Z = Q(R Z ) be the quotient field of the decomposition ring R Z . Norms of a ∈ Z are defined by
Lemma 10: For any a, b ∈ Z, we have
In the following, a means the η-vector of given a = η T · a ∈ R Z .
Lemma 11: (1) For any a ∈ Z, a 2 ≤ √ m a 2 .
(2) For any a ∈ R g , a 2 ≤ a 2 .
(3) If a ∈ R g is far from being proportional to vector 1 (far from constants in short), we have a 2 ≈ 1 √ m a 2 . Proof : (1) By Lemma 7, σ Z (a) = Ω Z a and by Lemma 5
The right-hand side matrix has eigenvalues g − 1 times of m and 1 with corresponding eigenvectors (1, −1, 0, · · · , 0), (1, 0, −1, 0, · · · , 0), . . ., (1, 0, · · · , 0, −1), (1, 1, · · · , 1). So, the symmetric matrix Ω * Z Ω Z can be diagonalized to Diag(m, · · · , m, 1) by an orthogonal transformation, and we have
. Similarly as above, the matrix Γ * Z Γ Z can be diagonalized to Diag(1/m, · · · , 1/m, 1) by the orthogonal transformation. Hence, s 1 (Γ Z ) = 1 and a 2 ≤ a 2 . Since almost all of the eigenvalues of Γ * Z Γ Z are 1/m, except 1 for eigenvector (1, 1, · · · , 1), if a is far from being proportional to the eigenvector (1, 1, · · · , 1), a 2 ≈ 1 √ m a 2 Lemma 12: (1) For any a ∈ Z, a ∞ ≤ √ mg a ∞ .
(2) For any a ∈ R g , a ∞ ≤ √ g a ∞ .
(3) If a is far from constants, we have a ∞ g/m a ∞ .
Proof : (1) By Lemma 11-(1), a ∞ ≤ a 2 ≤ √ m a 2 ≤ √ mg a ∞ .
(2) By Lemma 11-(2), a ∞ ≤ a 2 ≤ a 2 ≤ √ g a ∞ .
(3) By Lemma 11-
Subgaussian elements
We call a random variable a ∈ Z subgaussian with parameter s if corresponding random variable σ Z (a) on H Z is subgaussian with parameter s. Lemma 13 (Claim 2.1, Claim 2.4 [21] ): Let a i be independent subgaussian random variables over Z with parameter s i (i = 1, 2). Then, 1. The sum a 1 + a 2 is subgaussian with parameter
2. For any a 2 fixed, the product a 1 · a 2 is subgaussian with parameter a 2 ∞ s 1 . 
j=0 (w j s 2 + e j ) mod q. Let α, β, γ be as in Mult DR−FV and α , β , γ be their rounding noises in (− 1 2 , 1 2 ]. Set (d 0 , · · · , d l w −1 ) = WD(γ). Then,
= ∆m 1 m 2 + (m 1 e 2 + m 2 e 1 ) + e 1 e 2 /∆
Setting e = (m 1 e 2 + m 2 e 1 ) + e 1 e 2 /∆
Suppose an input ciphertext (α, β, γ) of Linearize DR−FV satisfies α + βs + γs 2 = ∆m + e mod q and its noise bound is ν. Let (a , b ) be the output ciphertext. Generate a switching key as swk = ((A j , B j ) l w −1 j=0 , ν swk ) = SwitchKeyGen DR−FV (s 2 , sk = s), which satisfies Σ l w −1 j=0 (A j + B j s) = Σ l w −1 j=0 (w j s 2 +e j ) mod q. Let (d 0 , · · · , d l w −1 ) = WD(γ). Then,
Therefore, 
This shows that the increase ratio of ν DR−FV mult by one multiplication isÕ( √ λ). It is because, the second term is 1 or 2) , so the increase ratio of second term isÕ(1) and it is smaller than that of the first termÕ( where l is level, a noise e ∈ R Z is uniquely determined by the equation a + bs = m + te + kq l for some k ∈ R Z . Note that m + te is not necessarily lower than q l . We define the value m + te as the noise term of ((a, b), s, m, l).
(1) Noise bound for correctness Let y = m + te. If y < q l 2 then decryption works correctly. By 12-(3), to satisfy this inequation, g m y ∞ < q l 2 is required. We define B BGV correct def = q l 2 m g . If the inherent noise y in a given level-l ciphertext satisfies y ∞ < B BGV correct then the ciphertext can be decrypted correctly.
(2) Estimate of B BGV clean For a fresh ciphertext, the upper bound of its inherent noise is B BGV clean = t gd(
(3) Estimate of B BGV scale Let a scaled ciphertext from q l to q l be (a , b , f, l , ν ) = Rescale((a, b, f, l, ν), l ), and write its inherent noise as y. Set P = q l q l and fix δ a and δ b s.t. δ a ≡ a (mod P) and δ a ≡ 0 (mod t), δ b ≡ b (mod P) and δ b ≡ 0 (mod t). Let (a 1 , b 1 , f 1 , ν 1 ) and (a 2 , b 2 , f 2 , ν 2 ) be input ciphertexts of Mult DR−BGV and compute α, β, γ according to Mult DR−BGV . Then, α + βs + γs 2 = a 1 a 2 + (a 1 b 2 + a 2 b 1 )s + b 1 b 2 s 2 mod q l = (a 1 + b 1 s)(a 2 + b 2 s) mod q l This means that B direct mult (ν 1 , ν 2 ) = ν 1 ν 2 .
(5) Estimate of B BGV lin Suppose an input ciphertext (α, β, γ) of Linearize DR−BGV satisfies α+βs+γs 2 ≡ m+te (mod q l ) and its noise is bound by ν. Let (a , b ) be the output ciphertext of Linearize DR−BGV with input (α, β, γ). Generate a switching key swk = ((A j , B j ) l w −1 j=0 , ν swk ) = SwitchKeyGen DR−BGV (s 2 , sk = s), which satisfies Σ l w −1 j=0 (A j + B j s) = Σ l w −1 j=0 (q s w j s 2 + te j ) mod q L−1 q s .
Let (d 0 , · · · , d l w −1 ) = WD(γ) and A = Σ l w −1 j=0 A j d j mod q l q s , B = Σ l w −1 j=0 and B j d j mod q l q s . Then,
A + Bs = Σ l w −1 j=0 (A j + B j s)d j mod q l q s = Σ l w −1 j=0 (q s w j s 2 + te j )d j mod q l q s = q s γs 2 + tΣ l w −1 j=0 e j d j mod q l q s After scaling from q l q s to q l , i.e. (a, b, f, l, ν ) = Rescale((A, B, f, l + s, ν), l), it satisfies that a + bs = γs 2 + t q s Σ l w −1 j=0 e j d j + e k mod q l .
where e k is a rounding noise added by In Mult DR−BGV , the noise bound of output ciphertext of Linearize DR−BGV is ν = ν 1 ν 2 + B BGV lin + B BGV scale , where ν 2 is a noise bound of ct 2 rescaled from q l 2 to q l 1 . After linearization, the noise is reduced by Rescale((a , b , f, l 1 , ν ), l 1 −1). Thus, the noise bound of one multiplication is as follows:
ν DR−BGV mult = ν 1 ( q l 1 q l 2 ν 2 + t( 3gd + 8d gh/3)) + 8tl w σgdw √ 3q s + t( 3gd + 8d gh/3) q l 1 −1 q l 1 + t( 3gd + 8d gh/3). Let ct be the ciphertext after L dec times multiplications, L be the maximum level in the system parameter, l = L − L dec be the level of ct and ν be the bound of the canonical embedding noise of ct . Then if ν ≤ B BGV correct (l ), then the scheme can homomorphically evaluate its own Decrypt DR−BGV circuit and will be fully homomorphic under circular security assumption. 
This shows that after multiple multiplications the noise bound of result ciphertext always keepsÕ( √ λ). We denote the bound for correctness of level-l ciphertext B BGV correct (l) (= q l 2 m g ). Since 
